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New ideas, products, and practices take time to diffuse, a fact that is often attributed to 
some form of heterogeneity among potential adopters.  This paper examines three broad 
classes of diffusion models -- contagion, social influence, and social learning – and 
shows how to incorporate heterogeneity into each at a high level of generality without 
losing analytical tractability.  Each type of model leaves a characteristic ‘footprint’ on 
the shape of the adoption curve that provides a basis for discriminating empirically 
between them. The approach is illustrated using the classic study of Ryan and Gross on 
the diffusion of hybrid corn (JEL O33, D8, M3). 
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I. Models of innovation diffusion 
 
A basic puzzle posed by innovation diffusion is why long lags occur between an 
innovation’s first appearance and its general acceptance within a population.  Among the 
factors that have been suggested are delays in acting on information, a desire to conform, 
learning from others, and changes in external factors such as prices.  There is an 
extensive literature on this phenomenon that spans economics, sociology, and marketing.
1  
Although the models are highly varied, a common theme is that delay results in part from 
heterogeneity among potential adopters.  People may realize different benefits and costs 
from the innovation, or they may hear about it at different times, have different amounts 
of information, different predispositions to conform, and so forth.   Nevertheless, most of 
the extant models incorporate heterogeneity in a very restricted fashion, say by 
considering two homogeneous classes of agents, or by assuming that the heterogeneity is 
described by a particular class of distributions.
2  
 
The purpose of this paper is three-fold.  First, it will be shown that the benchmark models 
in economics, marketing, and sociology proceed from fundamentally different 
assumptions that lead to key differences in their dynamical structure. Second, each type 
of model can be formulated at a high level of generality that allows for essentially any 
distribution of heterogeneous characteristics without losing analytical tractability. Third, 
each model leaves a distinctive ‘footprint’ in its pattern of acceleration that holds with 
few or no restrictions on the distribution of characteristics. The reason is that they have 
fundamentally different structures that details in the underlying distributions cannot 
overcome.  
 
                                                 
1 For general overviews see Vijay Mahajan and Robert A. Peterson (1985), Mahajan, Eitan Muller, and 
Frank M. Bass (1990), Paul A.Geroski (2000),  Paul Stoneman (2002), Everett M. Rogers (2003), and 
Thomas W. Valente (1995, 1996, 2005).   
2 See in particular Abel Jeuland (1981), Richard Jensen (1982), Massoud Karshenas and Stoneman (1992), 
and Geroski (2000).   3
We shall consider three broad classes of models – contagion, social influence, and social 
learning – that are drawn from the literature on marketing, sociology, and economics 
respectively.
3  The focus of attention will be on situations where the dynamics are driven 
from within, that is, there are internal feedback effects from prior to future adopters.   
Diffusion models that are driven mainly by external factors, such as price and quality 
changes, obviously depend on the exogenous rates of change in these factors, so much 
less can be said about them from an a priori standpoint.
4 
  
1. Contagion.  People adopt when they come in contact with others who have already 
adopted, that is, innovations spread much like epidemics. 
 
2. Social influence. People adopt when enough other people in the group have adopted, 
that is, innovations spread by a conformity motive.    
  
3. Social learning. People adopt once they see enough empirical evidence to convince 
them that the innovation is worth adopting, where the evidence is generated by the 
outcomes among prior adopters. Individuals may adopt at different times due to 
differences in their prior beliefs, amount of information gathered, and idiosyncratic costs. 
  
Of the three categories of models, social learning is certainly the most plausible from an 
economic standpoint, because it has firm decision-theoretic foundations: agents are 




                                                 
3 Some of these ideas have also been applied in anthropology; see in particular Robert Boyd and Peter J. 
Richerson (1985) and Joseph Henrich (2001).  
4 These are sometimes called “moving equilibrium” models; see in particular David (1966, 1969, 1975, 
2005), David and Trond E. Olsen (1984, 1986) and Stoneman (2002).  There are also hybrid models in 
which the dynamics are driven by a combination of external and internal factors. The most common 
example is the Bass model, which will be considered in section 3.    4
a decision.
5  By contrast, the contagion and social influence models are based on the 
notion of exposure rather than on utility maximization.  Why then should economists be 
concerned with them?  One reason is that they are the most prominent models in the 
literature outside of economics, so it is worth understanding how they work in a general 
setting.  A second reason is that we would like to know whether adoption curves 
generated by social learning differ from those generated purely by exposure, that is, 
whether we can distinguish empirically between the two explanations.  
 
We shall find that under certain conditions this is indeed the case. To make progress on 
this question, however, we need to formulate the aggregate dynamics of each class of 
model at a high level of generality without making restrictive assumptions about the 
distribution of individual characteristics.  This is particularly challenging in the case of 
social learning models, where there are multiple sources of heterogeneity, including 
different costs of adoption, different prior beliefs, and different amounts of information-
gathering. It turns out that all of these considerations can be folded together in a simple 
dynamical equation that is easy to analyze.  
 
One limitation of the analysis is the use of a “mean-field” approach in which the 
population is assumed to be infinitely large and encounters between individuals are 
purely random.  If the population is finite and agents interact through a fixed social 
network, the aggregate dynamics are substantially more complex and may depend on the 
topology of the network. The extent to which our results can be generalized to this case is 
an interesting question that will be left to future work.
6   
 
                                                 
5 There is a large literature on social learning but the specific assumptions are highly varied . See among 
others Sushil Bikchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welsh (1992), Abhijit Banerjee (1992), Alan Kirman 
(1993),  Glenn Ellison and Drew Fudenberg (1993, 1995),  Sandeep Kapur (1995),  Venkatesh Bala and 
Sanjeev Goyal (1998),  Lones Smith and Peter Sorensen (2000),  Kalyan Chatterjee and Susan H. Xu 
(2004), Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004), and Charles F. Manski (2004).  However, relatively little prior 
work has been done on the implications of social learning for the shape of the adoption curve.  Notable 
exceptions are Henrich (2001), Jensen (1982), and Dunia Lopez-Pintado and Duncan J. Watts (2008).    
6 For models of diffusion in social networks see Lawrence E. Blume (1993, 1995), Bala and Goyal (1998), 
H. Peyton Young (2003), Chatterjee and Xu (2004), Robin Cowan and Nicholas Jonard (2004), Matthew   5
The main results on shape and acceleration patterns can be summarized as follows.  
 
1.  A process that is driven purely by inertia must decelerate from start to finish, that is, 
the adoption curve is strictly concave. Acceleration -- in particular S-shaped curves -- 




2. A process that is driven purely by contagion typically accelerates initially and then 
decelerates as it approaches saturation (the curve is S-shaped), but it cannot accelerate 
beyond the fifty percent adoption level.  When everyone is alike, the hazard rate (the rate 
at which non-adopters become adopters) is linear and increasing in the current number of 
adopters.  From this it follows that the hazard rate must be non-increasing relative to the 
number of adopters.  Less obviously this result holds for any joint distribution of 
‘infection’ rates from a combination of internal and external sources. This forms a 
significant and testable implication of the contagion model, as we shall see in section 6. 
  
3. A process that is driven purely by social influence can either decelerate or accelerate 
initially, but in the latter case it typically accelerates at a super-exponential rate for some 
period of time.       
 
4.  A process that is driven purely by learning from the experiences of others (social 
learning with direct observation) usually begins slowly and may even decelerate initially.  
If such a process does eventually accelerate, it typically does so at a super-exponential 
rate for some period of time.   Moreover, the overall rate at which adoption proceeds is a 
monotone increasing function of the expected payoffs from adoption.  
                                                                                                                                                 
O. Jackson and Brian W. Rogers (2007),  Jackson and Leeat Yariv (2007), Benjamin Golub and Jackson 
(2008), and Fernando Vega-Redondo (2007). 
7This feature of inertia models distinguishes them from contagion models, as was pointed out in the classic 
study of medical innovation by James S. Coleman, Elihu Katz, and Herbert Menzel (1957, 1966). It is also 
a well-known feature of heterogeneous duration models (Tony Lancaster and Stephen Nickell, 1980; James 
J. Heckman and Burt Singer, 1982; Heckman, Richard Robb, and James R. Walker, 1990).  We draw 
attention to it here because it shows in a particularly transparent way how restrictions on shape can hold 
irrespective of the distribution of individual characteristics (in this case the inertia rates).    6
 
These results provide a general framework for assessing the relative plausibility of 
different mechanisms that could be driving a given diffusion process.   I t  i s  n o t  a n  
identification strategy, which is virtually impossible with aggregate-level data and 
difficult enough with micro-level data.   Rather, our results establish restrictions on the 
shape of adoption curves that are associated with particular explanatory mechanisms.  
The overall plausibility of a given explanation should be examined in conjunction with 
other information about the specific nature of the process, e.g., whether it was driven 
largely by internal communication among members of a population or by external 
sources such as advertising campaigns, whether payoffs played a prominent role (as in 
new production methods), or conformity was the main motive (as in new fashions).   We 
outline how this framework can be applied empirically using Bryce Ryan and Neal C. 
Gross’s classic study of the diffusion of hybrid corn in the 1920s and 1930s (Ryan and 
Gross, 1943).  While the data in this study are rather limited, it illustrates how the 
approach can be brought to bear on actual cases, and also highlights the kinds of data that 




Before launching into a discussion of the three main models, it will be useful to consider 
a much simpler reason why innovations take time to diffuse, namely, people sometimes 
delay in acting on new information.   This hypothesis leads to a particularly tractable 
model that has been studied in other contexts, notably heterogeneous duration models 
(see among others Lancaster and Nickell, 1980; Heckman and Singer, 1982; Heckman, 
Robb, and Walker, 1990).   We include it here because it forms a useful foil for the 
models to come later; furthermore all of the other models include inertia as one of the 
parameters, so this is by far the simplest case to analyze.  
 
First, consider a model of delayed adoption in which there is no heterogeneity among the 
agents.   Let λ  > 0  be the instantaneous rate at which any given non-adopter first adopts.   7
Let  () p t  be the proportion of adopters at time t, and let us set the clock so that  (0) 0 p = .  
The function  () p t  is called the adoption curve.   Assume for simplicity that once agents 
have adopted the new technology, they do not switch back to the old technology within 
the time frame of the analysis.  Then the expected motion is described by the ordinary 
differential equation  () ( 1 () ) p tp t λ =−  , which has the solution  ( ) 1
t p te
λ − =− given the 
initial condition  (0) 0 p = .   
 
Notice that this curve is concave throughout; in particular, it is not S-shaped.  It is a rather 
remarkable fact that this remains true when any amount of heterogeneity is introduced.  
To see this, suppose that  () ν λ  is the distribution of λ  in the population.  Then the 
expected trajectory of the process is given by  
 
  (1)                                                    () 1
t p te d
λ ν
− =− ∫ .                                                    
 
Differentiating (1) twice over, we see that  ( ) 0 pt <   irrespective of the distribution () ν λ .  
The intuition is straightforward: agents with high values of λ  tend to adopt earlier than 
those with low values of λ .  It follows that the average value of λ  in the current 
population of non-adopters is non-increasing, and the number of such individuals is 
strictly decreasing.  Thus the flow of new adopters is strictly decreasing.   
 
This simple example illustrates the kinds of results that hold in more complex situations: 
the structure of the model has implications for the shape of the curve that remain true 




Contagion refers to a process in which people adopt a new product or practice when they 
come in contact with others who have adopted it.  An everyday example would be a new 
fashion that spreads because people imitate those who have already adopted. The   8
resulting dynamics are similar to those of an epidemic; indeed, some of the models are 
borrowed directly from the epidemiology literature.   In the context of innovation 
diffusion it is common to use a two-parameter model that allows for contagion from 
within the group at one rate, and from sources outside the group at a different rate.  This 
is known as the Bass model of new product diffusion (Bass, 1969, 1980) or the mixed-
influence diffusion model (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985). In the context of a new fashion 
in clothing, for example, these two rates would correspond to seeing other people on the 
street who are wearing it, and seeing television ads that promote it.
8  
 
Let us begin by describing the homogeneous version of the model, later we shall 
introduce heterogeneity.  Let λ  be the instantaneous rate at which a current non-adopter 
‘hears about’ the innovation from a previous adopter within the group, and let γ  be the 
instantaneous rate at which he ‘hears about’ it from sources outside of the group.  We 
shall assume that λ and γ  are nonnegative, and that not both are zero.  In the absence of 
heterogeneity, such a process is described by the ordinary differential equation 
() ( () ) ( 1 () ) p tp t p t λ γ =+ −  , and the solution is  
 
 (2)                                 
() () ( ) [1 ]/[1 ]
tt pt e e
λγ λγ βγ βλ
−+ −+ =− + ,   0 λ > .                                       
 
When contagion is generated purely from internal sources ( 0 γ = ) this boils down to the 
ordinary logistic function, which is of course S-shaped.
9  When  innovation is driven 
solely by an external source ( 0 γ >  and  0 λ = ), we obtain the pure inertia discussed 
earlier.  When both γ  and λ  are positive, we can choose β  in expression (2) so that 
(0) 0 p = ; namely, with  1/ β γ =  we obtain 
 
(3)                                            
() () ( ) [1 ]/[1 ( ) ]
tt pt e e
λγ λγ λγ
−+ −+ =− +/ . 
                                                 
8 Some forms of internet advertising attempt to exploit internal feedback effects by informing members of a 
target group how many other members of their group have already adopted.    9
 
This model has spawned many variants, some of which assume a degree of heterogeneity, 
such as two groups with different contagion parameters (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1992;  
 
Geroski, 2000), while others employ distributions from a specific parametric family, such 
as gamma distributions (Jeuland, 1981).  
 
In fact, we can formulate a fully heterogeneous version that is analytically tractable and 
places virtually no restrictions on the joint distribution of the parameters.   Specifically, 
let  μ  be the joint distribution of the contagion parameters λ  and  γ .   Assume for 
analytical convenience that μ  has bounded support, which we may take to be 
2 [0,1] Ω= .   
(Rescaling λ  and γ  by a common factor is equivalent to changing the time scale, so this 
involves no real loss of generality.)  The only substantive restriction that we shall place 
on  μ  is that, averaged over the whole population, external influence is positive 
( 0 d γγ μ
Ω => ∫ ), for otherwise the process cannot get out of the initial state  (0) 0 p = .    
 
Let  () p t λγ ,  be the proportion of all type-( ) λ γ ,  individuals who have adopted by time t.   
Then the proportion of all individuals who have adopted by time t is  
 
(4)                                                           ( ) ( ) p tp t d λγ μ , =∫ .                                               
  
(Hereafter integration over Ω is understood.) Each subpopulation of adopters  () p t λγ ,  
evolves according to the differential equation  
 
 (5)                                          () ( () ) ( 1 () ) p tp t p t λγ λγ λ γ ,, = +−  .                                       
 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 The logistic model was common in the early work on innovation diffusion; see for example Zvi Griliches 
(1957) and Edwin Mansfield (1961).   10
This defines an infinite system of first-order differential equations coupled through the 
common term  () p t .   We can reduce it to a single differential equation by the following 
device: let  ( ) ln(1 ( )) x tp t λγ λγ ,, =−  and observe that (5) is equivalent to the 
system ( ) ( ( ) ) xt p t λγ λ γ , =− +   for all () λ γ , .  From this and the initial condition 
(0) 0 xλγ , =  we obtain 
(6)                                        
t
00 () ( () ) ()
t
x tp s d s p s d s t λγ λγ λ γ , = −+ = − − ∫∫ .                       
 
From the definition of  () x t λγ ,  it follows that 








=− ∫ ,                                              
 
that is,  () p t  satisfies the integral equation 
 









−−∫ =− ∫ . 
 
In other words, the current number of nonadopters 1 ( ) p t −  decays according to a 
weighted average of exponential functions, where the exponent depends on the elapsed 
time  t and the average adoption level up to t.   Starting from the initial condition 
(0) 0 p = , one can solve for  ( ) p t  by successive approximation.  
 
In this model the hazard rate  ()/ ( 1 () ) p tp t −   may be increasing or decreasing depending 
on the relative importance of the internal and external sources of contagion.   It turns out, 
however, that the hazard rate cannot increase relative to the current number of adopters, 
that is, the ratio  ()/ [ () ( 1 () ) ] p tp t p t −   must be nonincreasing. Furthermore, if contagion 
from external sources is present, the ratio must be strictly decreasing.   We shall call this 
ratio the relative hazard rate.   
   11
When the parameters λ γ ,  are fixed, it is obvious that that the relative hazard rate is 
nonincreasing, indeed this follows at once from the equation  () ( () ) ( 1 () ) p tp t p t λ γ = +−  .  
The claim is not so obvious when the parameters are heterogeneously distributed, 
including the possibility that λ  and γ  are negatively correlated: people who are heavily 
influenced by outside sources (high γ ) might be less susceptible to information from 
inside sources (low λ ), and so forth.  
 
Proposition 1.  Suppose that diffusion is driven by heterogeneous contagion with positive 
external influence. Then the hazard rate decreases relative to the number of adopters, 
which implies that the process cannot accelerate beyond  1/2 p =  . 
                                                                                                                  
The last statement follows immediately from the prior one, because if  () p t  were to 
accelerate beyond ½, then at that point the numerator of  ()/ [ () ( 1 () ) ] p tp t p t −   would be 
increasing and the denominator would be decreasing, contradicting the assertion that the 
hazard rate decreases relative to the number of adopters (this is proved in the Appendix).   
 
We remark that there are perfectly reasonable S-shaped curves that do not satisfy the 
monotonicity condition in proposition 1.  Consider, for example, an adoption process 
described by the differential equation  ( ) ( )(1 ( ))
a p tp t p t =−  , which was first proposed as 
a model of innovation diffusion by Christopher J. Easingwood, Mahajan, and Muller 
(1981, 1983).   When  1 a > , 
1 ()/ [ () ( 1 () ] ()
a p tp t p t pt
− −=   is strictly increasing, hence 
Proposition 1 shows that such a process cannot arise from a contagion model with any 
amount of heterogeneity.   Nevertheless, it is possible to generate an S-shaped curve from 
a contagion model -- in fact from a homogeneous contagion model – whose overall 
appearance is very similar (see Figure 1).  
    12
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Figure 1.  Two adoption curves: the solid line is generated by 
1.1 () ( 1 ) p tp p =−   and 
(0) 0.01 p = , the dashed line by a Bass model with  .75 λ = and  .0025 γ = . 
 
 
IV. Social influence 
                                                      
The sociological literature on innovation stresses the importance of social pressure on 
individual decisions about whether to adopt.  In the standard model individuals are 
assumed to have different ‘thresholds’ that determine whether they will adopt as a 
function of the number (or proportion) of others in the population who have already 
adopted.    The dynamics of these models were first studied by Thomas C. Schelling 
(1971, 1978), Mark Granovetter (1978), and Granovetter and Roland Soong (1988); for 
more recent work in this vein see Michael W. Macy (1991), Valente (1995, 1996, 2005), 
Peter Sheridan Dodds and Watts (2004, 2005), Damon Centola (2006), and Lopez-
Pintado and Watts (2008).   
 
For each agent i, suppose that there exists a minimum proportion  0 i r ≥  such that i 
adopts as soon as  i r  or more of the group has adopted.  (If  1 i r >  the agent never adopts.)  
This is called the social threshold of agent i.  The precise meaning of these thresholds 
varies from one context to another; broadly speaking we can think of them as degrees of 
responsiveness to social influence. A concrete example would be the transmission of 
rumors: some people would need to hear the rumor from many people to pass it on while 
others might only need to hear it once.  Another is fashion: some people need to see only 
a few others wearing a new kind of clothing in order to try it, whereas others will wait   13
until the fashion is widespread before jumping on the bandwagon. A key feature of such a 
model is that the adoption depends on the innovation’s current popularity rather than on 
how good or desirable the innovation has proven to be.
10  The latter is the basis of social 
learning models, which we shall take up in the next section. 
 
We wish to model the aggregate dynamics without assuming a specific parametric form 
for the distribution of thresholds.  To this end, let  ( ) Fr be the cumulative distribution 
function of thresholds in some given population.   At time t the proportion of people 
whose thresholds have been crossed is  ( ( )) Fp t .  Of these,  ( ) p t  have already adopted, so 
the proportion whose thresholds have been crossed but have not yet adopted is 
(( ) ) ( ) Fp t p t − . Let  0 λ >  be the instantaneous rate at which these people convert.  Then 
the adoption process is described by the differential equation 
 
 (9)                                                ( ) [ ( ( )) ( )], 0 pt F pt pt λ λ = −>  .                                       
 
Assume that  (0) 0 F >  and let b  be the first fixed point of F , that is, the smallest number 
in (0, 1] such that  ( ) Fb b = , if any such exists; otherwise let  1 b = .   We then have 
() Fp p >  for all  [0, ) p b ∈ .   Since (9) is a separable ordinary differential equation, we 
obtain the following explicit solution for the inverse function 
1() tpx
− = : 
  
(10)                               [0, ), x b ∀∈      
1
0 () ( 1 / ) / ( () )
x
tpx d r F rr λ
− = =− ∫ .                        
                                                                                       
 
Notice that the right-hand side is integrable because  ( ) Fr is monotone nondecreasing 
and ( ) Fr r −  is bounded away from zero for all r  in the interval [0, ] x  whenever x b < .   
(The constant of integration is zero because of the initial condition  (0) 0 p = .)  As  x b → , 
the right-hand side of (10) goes to infinity, which implies that the adoption curve 
                                                 
10Popularity is a factor in some of the economics models of diffusion; see in particular Ellison and 
Fudenberg (1993, 1995).    14
approaches  b  asymptotically. In particular, the adoption process peters out as it 
approaches the first fixed point of F  . 
 
This phenomenon is illustrated in figure 2.  Here we assume that the thresholds are 
normally distributed to the right of the origin, and there is a point mass at the origin 
corresponding to the subset of innovators -- the people who are willing to adopt even 
when no one else adopted.   Notice that the adoption curve asymptotes to  0.50 p = , 
which is the first fixed point of F .  There is nothing special about the normal distribution 
in this regard; similar results hold for any c.d.f. where it first crosses the 45
o - line.   
 
The adoption curve in figure 2 is concave, but this is by no means necessary or even 
typical for this family of models.  Figure 3 illustrates an entirely different adoption curve 
that is generated by a truncated normal with smaller mean and variance. An interesting 
feature of this curve is that it accelerates very sharply in the early stages; indeed it can be 
shown that it grows at a faster-than-exponential rate up to  0.10 p = .    
 
We claim that whenever the process starts in the left tail of the distribution the curve must 
have one of two shapes: either it decelerates initially, or it accelerates initially at a super-
exponential rate.  To see why this is so, consider the basic dynamic equation in (9).  
Assume that  (0) 0 F >  and that F  has a continuous density  ( ) f p  defined for all 
(0,1] p∈ .  (Note that the density is not defined at the origin because there is a point mass 
there.)   Differentiating (9) with respect to t and dividing through by  () pt  , which by 
assumption is positive, we obtain 
 
(11)                                                     ()/ () [ ( () ) 1 ] pt pt f pt λ = −   .                                       
 
In other words, the relative acceleration rate traces out a positive linear transformation of 
the underlying density.  It follows that the process accelerates initially if and only if the 
initial density is large enough, that is,  ( ) 1 fp>  in a neighborhood of the origin.  Suppose    15
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                             c) social threshold adoption curve  () p t  
 
 
Figure 2.  Density, c.d.f., and social threshold adoption curve generated by  N(.50, .25) 
and λ  = 4. 
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Figure 3.  Density, c.d.f., and social threshold adoption curve generated by N(.10, .01) 
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further that  () f p  is increasing in a neighborhood of the origin, that is, the process starts 
in the left tail of the distribution of thresholds.  Then (11) shows that the relative 
acceleration rate  ()/ () p tp t    is also strictly increasing, that is, the adoption curve exhibits 
super-exponential growth.
11  This phenomenon results from the compounding of two 
effects.   First, as more and more people adopt, the amount of information available to the 
remainder of the population increases.  Second, the number of people persuaded by each 
additional bit of information increases as the process moves up the left tail of the 
distribution. 
 
These conclusions continue to hold when λ  is heterogeneously distributed according to 
some distribution function ν λ () .   Since λ  is a scaling parameter, there is no real loss of 
generality in assuming that the support of ν  lies in (0, 1].  Let  ( ) Fp λ  be the cumulative 
distribution of thresholds  p  conditional on λ , and assume that the conditional density 
() f p λ  exists for every  (0,1] p∈ .  The following proposition is proved in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2.  Suppose that diffusion is driven by a heterogeneous social threshold 
model, where  there is a positive mass of individuals who are prepared to adopt when no 
one else adopts, and the threshold densities  () f p λ   are positive and increasing in a 
common neighborhood of zero for all λ .  If the process accelerates initially then it 
accelerates initially at a super-exponential rate for some period of time.  
    
V.  Social learning 
 
A notable limitation of the contagion and social influence models is that they provide no 
clear reason why people would adopt an innovation given that others have adopted it.  In 
this section we consider a class of learning models in which the adoption decision flows 
directly from the rational evaluation of evidence. Specifically, let us suppose that an 
                                                 
11 Growth is exponential if  ()/ () pt pt   is constant, super-exponential if  ()/ () pt pt    is strictly increasing, 
and sub-exponential if  ()/ () pt pt    is strictly decreasing.   18
agent adopts if he has reason to believe the innovation is better than what he is doing 
now, where the evidence comes from directly observing the outcomes among prior 
adopters. For example, when a new product becomes available -- e.g., a new type of 
medication (antibiotics) or a new communication technology (cellphones) -- people will 
want to see how it works for others over a period of time before trying it themselves.   
These are variously known as social learning models or social learning models based on 
direct observation.   
 
There is a sizable theoretical literature on social learning, but it is difficult to summarize 
due to the great diversity in behavioral and informational assumptions that different 
authors use. Some assume that payoff outcomes among prior adopters are fully 
observable, while others assume only that the act of adoption is observable (the latter are 
usually called herding models).  Some assume that agents can recognize others’ types, 
while others assume that types cannot be identified.  There are also significant differences 
in the relevant characteristics that authors choose to focus on, including heterogeneity in 
risk aversion, discount rates, and amount of information.
12 
    There is considerable 




Here we shall make a number of simplifying assumptions in order to get a handle on an 
issue that has not received much previous attention in this literature, namely, what do the 
short-run aggregate dynamics of a heterogeneous learning model look like, and do they 
differ qualitatively from the dynamics generated by other classes of models?  
 
To make some progress on this question let us make the following assumptions: i) 
payoffs are observable; ii) payoffs generated by different individuals and/or at different 
points in time are independent and equally informative; iii) agents are risk-neutral and 
                                                 
12 See among others Bikchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welsh (1992), Banerjee (1992), Kirman (1993), Ellison 
and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), Kapur (1995), Bala and Goyal (1998), Smith and Sorensen (2000), Chatterjee 
and Xu (2004), Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004), Manski (2004), Golub and Jackson (2008). 
13 Andrew Foster and Mark Rosenzweig (1995), Kaivan Munshi (2004), Timothy G. Conley and 
Christopher R. Udry (2005).    19
myopic; iv) there is no idiosyncratic component to payoffs due to differences in agents’ 
types, but agents may have different costs (not necessarily observable); v) there are 
differences in agents’ prior beliefs about how good the innovation is relative to the status 
quo; vi) there are differences in the average number of people they observe and hence in 
the amount of information they have; vii) the population is fully mixed.   Many other 
complicating factors could be introduced, such as discounting, one-time switching costs, 
risk aversion, imperfect observability, restricted information acquisition (such as through 
social networks), but these extensions would distract from the main point, which is to 
identify the dynamic characteristics of a fairly general class of learning models without 
attempting to formulate the most general such model. 
  
We claim that, under the above assumptions, the dynamical system has a surprisingly 
simple structure.  One can reduce the various types of heterogeneity to a composite index 
that measures the probability of a given agent adopting, conditional on the amount of 
information that has been generated thus far in the population.  The equation of motion  
of such a process turns out to be analogous to the one obtained for the social influence 
model, except that here the relevant state variable at time t turns out to be the integral of 
the adoption curve up through t, 
0 ()
t
p sd s ∫ , rather than the level of adoption  () pt .
14  The 
reason is that 
0 ()
t
p sd s ∫  measures the cumulative information generated by all prior 
adopters from the time they first adopted, which is the relevant variable in the learning 
context.    
 
To illustrate how such a model works, let us walk through a particular example using a 
standard normal-normal updating framework.  This is chosen mainly for its 
computational transparency; similar results hold under alternative assumptions.
15  
Assume that the payoff from the innovation is a normally distributed random variable  X  
                                                 
14 Recall that the integral of the adoption curve also featured in the heterogeneous contagion model (see 
equation (8)). 
15 Jensen (1982) and Lopez-Pintado and Watts (2008) study the case where the outcome variable is 
binomial  (payoffs are “high” or “low”). They assume that agents pay attention only to current outcomes, 
not the cumulative amount of information generated from earlier periods.   20
with mean  0 μ >  and variance 
2 σ , which is i.i.d. among agents and time periods.  We 
shall interpret μ  as the mean payoff gain per period  from using the innovation as 
compared to the status quo technology.  Each agent is assumed to have an idiosyncratic 
variable cost  i c  of using the innovation, so he adopts if and only if he believes that the 
mean payoff per period is at least  i c  (thus he may switch back if after receiving more 
information he believes that the mean payoff is less than  i c ).  
 
If everyone knew the true value of μ  from the outset, then everyone would adopt for 
whom  i c μ < .  This is the efficient outcome.   Ex ante, however, people do not know the 
true value of μ ; furthermore, they may start with substantially different beliefs (based on 
their prior private information) about what the true value is.  As more information comes 
in, they update their beliefs.  If this information is sufficiently favorable, more people 
will adopt, which creates a still-larger base of information, which causes even more 
people to adopt, and so on.  This is the essential logic driving the learning dynamics.   
 
To continue with our example, suppose that each agent i has a prior belief about the 
unknown mean μ  and unknown precision 
2 1/ ρ σ =  such that: i) the marginal of ρ  is 
gamma-distributed, and ii) for each value of ρ  the conditional distribution of μ  is 
normal with mean  0 i μ  and precision  i ρτ .  (This is a standard normal-normal updating 
model; see Morris De Groot (1970).)   Low values of  i τ  reflect flexibility in beliefs, that 
is, relatively little evidence is needed to shift   ' is  belief about the mean by a given 
amount.  Low values of  0 i μ  reflect pessimism about the payoffs from the innovation.   In 
particular, if i initially believes that the mean is less than his costs,  0 ii c μ < , he will not 
want to adopt.  As more information comes in, however, his posterior estimate of the 
mean, it μ , may increase sufficiently that he changes his mind.  The point at which this 
happens depends, among other things, on how much information i collects and how 
flexible his beliefs are.   
   21
At a given point in time t, agent i will have seen (or heard about) a random assortment 
of prior outcomes depending on the chance encounters he had with other members of the 
population.  In a continuous-time setting the total “number” or measure of prior outcomes 
up to time t is given by the integral under the adoption curve, namely, 
0 () ()
t
rt psd s =∫ .  
Assuming that i is equally likely to see any particular outcome, we can model  ' is  flow 
of information by a Poisson arrival process. In particular, let  it N  be a Poisson random 
variable representing the number of  ' is  observations up to time t, where  [ ] ( ) it i EN rt β =   
and the parameter  i β  is a measure of the extent to which i “gets around.”
16   
Let  it n  denote the realization of  it N , and let  it x  denote the mean payoff among these  it n  
observations.  Given our assumptions,  it x  is normal with mean μ  and standard deviation 
/ it n σ .   In the normal-normal updating framework,  ' is  Bayesian posterior estimate of 




(12)                                                        











 .                                       
 
In other words, the posterior estimate is just a weighted average of the prior and the 
observed mean, where the weight on the mean is the number of independent observations 
that produced it.   
  
Given our assumption that i is myopic, she is prepared to adopt once  it μ  is at least equal 
to her variable  i c , which by (12) is equivalent to  
 
(13)                                                       0 ()( ) it i it i i i xc n c τ μ − ≥−  .                                         
                                                 
16 If agents were embedded in a fixed social network, the analogous parameter would be the number of 
other agents with whom a given agent is connected. In this case, however, the aggregate amount of 
information  () rt  will generally not be sufficient to describe the state of the system; the dynamics of the 
process will depend on the specific network topology.  See Golub and Jackson (2008).      22
By assumption () ( / ) it it it x nz μσ − =  is  (0,1) N , hence (13) can be re-written as 
 
(14)                                               0 () ( )
it






μ τμ +− ≥ − . 
 
To make sense of this expression, let us focus on the subpopulation of agents for whom 
adoption is worthwhile, 
0 {: } i Pi c μ => , and substitute the expected value  [ ] ( ) it i En rt β =  
into (14).  After rearranging terms we obtain 
 
 (15)                                               













.                                   
Define  ' is  resistance level (or information threshold) to be the expected value of the 
right-hand side of this inequality, namely, 
 














 .                                              
 
We shall say that an agent is of type  i if she has the vector of characteristics 
( 0 ,,, ii i i c τ βμ).  From (15) and (16) we see that an agent of type i is increasingly likely to 
adopt as  () rt passes the threshold  i r .   Moreover, this threshold has a natural 
interpretation: agents with high  i r  are those who are initially pessimistic that the 
innovation will cover their costs ( 0 ii c μ −  is large), inflexible in their initial beliefs ( i τ  is 
large),  marginally  profitable ( i c μ −  is low), and relatively uninformed ( i β  is small). 
 
The precise form of expressions (15) and (16) is not essential for our purpose however: 
the key point is that each agent  i has a response function  () i r φ , which represents the   23
probability that i believes the innovation is worth adopting, given that the total amount of 
information generated by the prior adopters equals r .
17  
 
Let us now abstract from this particular example and take the notion of a response 
function as a primitive of the learning model.   Suppose that each agent in the population 
has a “type” i that is characterized by a response function  : [0,1] i R φ + → , where  ( ) i r φ  is 
the probability that  ' is  information threshold has been crossed when the total amount of 
information generated by the prior adopters is r .  For ease of interpretation we shall 
assume that the functions  ( ) i r φ  are monotone nondecreasing, though this is not actually 
necessary for some of the results to follow.   Notice that a given individual will typically 
know only a small fraction of the prior outcomes, that is, r  is a state variable that 
represents a common pool of information but it is not common knowledge.  
 
Assume that there are countably many types in the population, and let  i p  be the 
proportion of i-types.
18   When the total information generated by prior adopters equals 
r , the proportion of the population whose thresholds have been crossed is given by the 
function 
 
(18)                                                                  ( ) ( ) ii
i
Fr p r φ =∑  .                                         
 
                                                 
17 In the present case, the response function has the following explicit representation. Given that  () rt r = , 
it n  is Poisson-distributed with mean 
ir β .   Given a realization  0
it nk = > , the mean observed payoff, 
it x , 
is normal with mean  μ  and variance 
2 /k σ .   Let Φ  denote the standard normal c.d.f.  Then the 
probability that  ' is  posterior estimate exceeds  ' is  costs, i.e., the probability that (13) holds, is  
 
 (17)                                               
0
1
() ( ) ( )
() [ ( ]
!
ir k
ii i i i
k
i










=Φ − ∑ .      
            
18 Alternatively we could assume that the types are uncountable and distributed according to a density; this 
makes no material difference in the subsequent analysis.    24
() Fr is a monotone nondecreasing function which we can interpret as a notional 
distribution function of agents’ information thresholds.  We allow for the possibility that 
some agents have an infinite threshold, hence lim ( ) r Fr →∞  may be less than one.





rt psd s =∫ , it follows that the aggregate dynamics is described by 
the differential equation 
  
(19)                                            
0 () [ ( () ) () ] , 0
t
pt F psd s pt λλ = −> ∫  .                                
 
 
Observe that (19) is analogous to the dynamical equation (9) defining a social threshold 
model, except that in the present case the argument of F  is the integral of the adoption 
curve rather than the adoption curve itself. This arises because agents use all past 
information generated by previous adopters rather than just the most recent information. 
Note that this formulation hinges on our assumption that payoff information is equally 
informative no matter when it was received. If this were not the case, for example if 
payoffs received in earlier time periods were less valuable, the defining equation would 
have to be modified accordingly.
20   
 
The cumulative feature of the social learning model has some important implications for 
the shape of the adoption curve.   Compared to the social influence model acceleration is 
initially quite weak; in fact in a neighborhood of the origin the process strictly 
                                                 
19 The closest model to this one in the literature is due to Dodds and Watts (2004, 2005). They consider a 
cumulative-dose model of infection with heterogeneity in the thresholds at which agents become infected 
(including social as well as biological interpretations of infection), though their analysis of the dynamics 
emphasizes different features from the ones considered here.  
20 If payoff information is discounted at some rate 0 δ > , the dynamical equation takes the form 
()
0 () [ ( () ) () ]
t ts pt F e psd s pt
δ λ
−− =− ∫  .  Note that when δ  is large, this process is similar to the social 
influence model.  Another modification is to allow for joint heterogeneity in λ  and r; this extension is 
straightforward and is left to the reader.   25
decelerates irrespective of the distribution generating it.   To see why this is so, 
differentiate equation (19) to obtain the acceleration equation  
 
(20)                                                  ( 1 / ) () () (() ) () pt pt f rt pt λ = −   .                                   
 
By assumption  (0) 0 p =  and the solution  () pt  is continuous, so the first term is close to 
zero when t is close to zero.  However, the second term is bounded away from zero when 
t is close to zero, because (19) implies that  (0) (0) 0 pF λ = >  .   Hence 
 
(21)                                            
2
0 lim ( ) (0) ( (0)) (0) 0
t pt F f p p λ + → = −+ <  .                       
 
More generally, when we compare (20) with the acceleration equation for the social 
influence model, namely, ( 1 / ) () () ( () ) () p t pt f pt pt λ = −    , we see that the former has 
weaker initial acceleration than the latter because  () p t   is initially positive whereas  () p t  
is initially zero. The result may be an extended period of weak growth in the early phases 
of social learning.   The reason is that the initial block of optimists  (0) F  exerts a 
decelerative drag on the process: they contribute at a decreasing rate as their numbers 
diminish, while the information generated by the new adopters gathers steam slowly 
because there are so few of them to begin with.
21   Figure 4 illustrates this phenomenon 
for the same density that generated the social thresholds adoption curve in Figure 3.   
                                          
                                                 
21Initial deceleration does not necessarily occur, however, if observations are bunched at particular points in 
time. An example would be an agricultural innovation (e.g., a new type of crop) that is tried once in each 
growing season, and whose outcomes farmers observe at the end of the season. This case will be discussed 
















Figure 4.  Adoption curve generated by social learning, a normal distribution of 
                  information thresholds N(.10, .01), and λ = 4.  
 
Next we shall investigate the behavior of the relative acceleration rate  ( )/ ( ) p tp t   . To 
avoid uninteresting technical complications let us assume that the density is well-behaved 
near the origin, that is, 
0 (0) lim ( ) 0
r ff r + → => , and that  f ′ is continuous and bounded.   
Define 
 
(22)                                                        () ( 1 / ) ()/ () tp t p t φ λ =   .                                           
 
From (20) we deduce that 
 
 
(23)                                                  () (() ) ()/ () 1 t f rt pt pt φ = −  .                                           
 
Differentiating (23) we obtain 
 
(24)                         
22 () (() ) ()/ () (() ) (() ) () ()/ () t f rt p t pt f rt f rt ptpt p t φ ′ =+ −     .               
 
As  0 t
+ →  the first term in (24) goes to zero, because by assumption  f ′ is bounded, 
() 0 pt → , and  (0) 0 p >  .  The third term also goes to zero.  However, 
(() ) ( 0 ) 0 fr t f →> , so the second term is positive in the limit. It follows from continuity   27
that ( ) t φ   is strictly positive on some initial interval 0 tT ≤ ≤ .  In the region near the 
origin where  () 0 pt <  , this says that the relative acceleration rate is becoming less 
negative.    
 
Now suppose that at some time  0 t  the process begins to accelerate.  If at this point the 
density is increasing, then  0 (( ) ) 0 fr t ′ > , and it follows from (24) and continuity that  ( ) t φ   
is positive for some interval of time beginning at  0 t . In other words, if the density is 
increasing when the process begins to accelerate (assuming it ever does accelerate), then 
the process undergoes a period of super-exponential growth. 
 
Proposition 3.  Suppose that diffusion is driven by social learning, where there is a 
positive mass of individuals who adopt even when no one else adopts ( (0) 0 F > ), and the 
distribution of resistances has a density  () f r  that is bounded away from zero near the 
origin and has a continuous bounded derivative.  Then initially the process decelerates 
whereas the relative acceleration rate strictly increases.  If the process begins to 
accelerate, and if the density is increasing at that point, then the process undergoes a 
period of super-exponential growth.   
  
 
Propositions 2 and 3 show that both the social influence model and the social learning 
model can exhibit periods of super-exponential growth.  This is consistent with 
observations by various authors that adoption curves often exhibit a sudden take-off 
phase after a slow start (Ryan and Gross, 1943; Henrich, 2001; Maarten C. M. Vendrik, 
2003; Rogers, 2003).  The above propositions are more specific in predicting super-
exponential growth, and they clarify why one would expect it theoretically.  Theory also 
suggests why the curves generated by social influence and social learning will differ in 
other respects.  One difference is that, in a social learning model, the speed of adoption at 
a given point in time depends on adoption levels at earlier points in time, whereas in a 
social influence model this is not the case.  Given sufficiently detailed adoption data this 
effect could be tested by regression analysis with lagged variables.     28
 
A second distinction between the models is the way in which the resistance thresholds are 
constructed.  In a social influence model the thresholds reflect differences in a single 
scalar parameter (people’s tendency to conform), whereas in a social learning model they 
reflect differences in a variety of factors, including prior beliefs, amount of information 
gathered, and the payoff gain from the innovation.  Some of these factors are 
unobservable and would be difficult estimate even with micro-level adoption data. 
However, the payoff gain -- the parameter μ  in the social learning model -- can 
sometimes be estimated from the data, as we shall see the next section.    
 
The key point to observe is that higher average payoffs from adoption shift the individual 
response functions upward: for a given “number” of prior outcomes r  in the population, 
the probability  ( ) i r φ  that any given individual i adopts increases the higher the potential 
payoff gain μ .  Thus if we consider two distinct populations { } 1, 2  such that one has a 
higher mean payoff than the other, say  21 μ μ > , then all else being equal the resistance 
distributions satisfy  21 () () Fr Fr ≥  for all r .  ( 1 F  first-order stochastically dominates  2 F .)  
Under these circumstances, adoption occurs more rapidly in population 2 than in 
population 1, that is, the solutions satisfy  21 () () p tp t ≥  for all t.
22   This is one way to 
evaluate the plausibility of the social learning model without knowing much about the 
distribution of the learning parameters.  
 
 
                                                 
 
22 Consider the dynamical equations  () [ ( () ) () ] , 1 , 2
ii i i pt Fpt pt i λ =− =  . Let  12 () , () pt pt be the solutions, 
which we assume to be continuous.  Note that 
21 (0) (0) pp ≥  , because by assumption 
21 (0) (0) FF ≥  and 
12 (0) (0) 0 pp == .  Suppose, by way of contradiction, that  21 () () pt pt <  at some time  0 t > .  By 
continuity there is a time  0 t >   such that 
21 () () ps ps ≥  for all  s t ≤   and  21 () () pt pt <   . Therefore 
21 00 () ()
tt
p s ds p s ds ≥ ∫∫

 and 
22 11 00 (( ) )(( ) )
tt
F ps d s F ps d s ≥ ∫∫

, from which it follows that  21 () () pt pt ≥   , a 
contradiction.     29
VI. The diffusion of hybrid corn 
 
Diffusion data that permit definitive tests of the preceding propositions are not easy to 
come by.  One reason is that an adoption curve must be charted at frequent time intervals 
in order to conduct tests of statistical significance. Consider, for example, a product or 
practice that took ten years to go from introduction to completion.  If the adoption level is 
measured annually, there will be only ten data points, only nine first differences, and only 
eight second differences; furthermore the errors in successive differences will not be 
independent.  Of course, the situation would be different if we had monthly or weekly 
data over a period of ten years, but there appear to be very few data sets of this sort in the 
literature. Moreover, the data that do exist tend to be for new products where mass 
advertising played a critical role.  In these cases it is difficult to sort out the relative 
importance of internal and external sources of information, though the mixed-influence  
contagion model is certainly a step in that direction.  
 
Fortunately, there exist some data that are sufficiently detailed to carry out a preliminary 
analysis of the ideas discussed above.    The example we choose here is Ryan and Gross’s 
classic study of the diffusion of hybrid corn in two Iowa communities (Ryan and Gross, 
1943).  This work prompted a number of later studies on innovation diffusion, including 
Zvi Griliches’s analysis of hybrid corn diffusion across the midwestern and southern 
United States (Griliches, 1957).  Although the latter is more comprehensive in its 
geographical coverage, the study by Ryan and Gross has several advantages for our 
purposes.   First, it was carried out at the community level, whereas the adoption curves 
in Griliches’s study were aggregated over several counties and involved scores of 
dispersed communities.  Second, Ryan and Gross provided the proportion of hybrid corn 
adopters, whereas Griliches gave the proportion of acreage planted in hybrid corn, which 
(among other things) biases the results toward large landowners.  Third, the Ryan and 
Gross data covered the critical start-up phase in the 1920s, which was absent in 
Griliches’s analysis.  Finally, Ryan and Gross’s study included important related 
information, such as the year that farmers first learned about the new technology and the 
sources from which they learned about it.   These data provide additional contextual   30
details that, together with the shape of the curve itself, allow us to assess the relative 
plausibility of different diffusion mechanisms. 
 
The adoption curve is shown in Figure 5.   Particularly noteworthy features are the long 
choppy start, which lasted for some six years (1927-32), followed by a sharp acceleration 
for about four years (1933-36), and then a rapid deceleration as nearly 100 percent 
acceptance levels were reached in 1941.
23   
 
Ryan and Gross repeatedly emphasize that natural conservatism was one of the key 
reasons why farmers delayed so long in adopting a technology that could have 
substantially increased their profits.  Indeed, their survey data reveal that, although at 
least two-thirds of the farmers had heard about the advantages of hybrid corn as early as 
1931, only about 8 percent had adopted by then.  Thus pure inertia could well have been 
the explanation for the long delay.  Nevertheless, the shape of the curve suggests that this 
was not the case.  The reason is that, in a pure inertia model with heterogeneous levels of 
inertia, the adoption curve must be concave throughout.  This hypothesis can be rejected 
with reasonable confidence, since there was deceleration in only one of the first ten time 
periods, and sharp acceleration in most of them.   Thus, although inertia may have been a 
contributing factor, it was unlikely to have been the sole factor.  
 
Another interesting aspect of Ryan and Gross’s survey is that farmers reported their 
sources of information about the new technology, and identified the sources they believed 
were most influential in their decision to adopt. Whereas seed salesmen were listed as the 
most common original source of knowledge, neighbors were listed as the most influential 
in deciding whether to implement it.  This is broadly consistent with the three classes of 
models under consideration, all of which posit that adoption results from an internal 
feedback loop between earlier and later adopters.   
 
                                                 
23 These features have been noted by other authors, notably Henrich (2001), who explains them by a 
combination of learning from direct experience and biased cultural transmission. 
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Figure 5.  Percent of adopters of hybrid corn in two Iowa communities, 1926-41 (from 
Ryan and Gross, 1943, fig. 4). 
 
Let us consider the contagion model first.   This posits that adoption decisions are driven 
by a combination of internal and external influences, where external influence operates at 
a constant rate and internal influence operates at a rate proportional to the current number 
of adopters.  We know that this model generally produces S-shaped curves, but we also 
know that the curve has a particular property: the hazard rate must be nonincreasing 
relative to the current number of adopters.  (It can be verified that this property also holds 
in the discrete-time version.)   
 
To check this, let  t p  be the proportion of adopters at the end of period t, and let 
1 tt t p p + Δ= −  be the rate of change at t.   Then  / (1 ) tt t t Hp p = Δ−  should be 
nonincreasing in t, and strictly decreasing if there is any outside influence.    t H  is the 
piecewise linear curve shown in figure 6. 
 
To test whether it is monotone nonincreasing, let us fit a cubic polynomial using OLS 
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Figure 6.  Cubic polynomial (smooth line) fitted by OLS to the relative hazard 
rate / (1 ) tt t t Hp p =Δ − (jagged line).    
The overall fit is very good (R
2 = .86), and the quadratic and cubic coefficients differ in 
sign at a highly significant level.   We therefore have reason to believe that  t H  is not a 
monotone function, which is corroborating evidence against the contagion hypothesis.  
Of course this is not the same as saying that there is no contagion effect, merely that this 
effect by itself is unlikely to have produced the Ryan and Gross data. 
Next let us consider the social influence and social learning models.  Ryan and Gross 
argued that the balance of evidence from the survey suggested some form of learning by 
farmers: “In some sense the early acceptors provided a community laboratory from which 
neighbors could gain some vicarious experience with the new seed over a period of some 
years” (ibid, p. 16).   This is precisely the effect posited in the social learning model.   Is 
social learning consistent with the shape of the curve?  The answer is affirmative.  Indeed 
the curve has two features that are quite typical of social learning models: there is a long   33
slow start-up followed by very rapid acceleration. We remind the reader why this is so: in 
the early phases adoption is driven mainly by people who are already convinced that the 
new technology is a good idea but who may delay due to inertia; once this effect is 
overcome there is rapid acceleration caused by the accumulation of information provided 
by prior adopters, combined with the rising number of people at the margin who are 
persuaded by the new information.  
Unfortunately, the curve does not have enough data points to carry out tests of 
significance, but we can make a rough estimate of the relative acceleration rate in the 
following way.  First compute the average slope over successive three-year intervals in 
order to smooth out the data.  Then compute the relative acceleration rate as the ratio of 
successive slopes minus unity.
24  The results are shown in table 1 for three different ways 
of grouping the data.  In every case the relative acceleration rate rises sharply from the  
second to the third period. (Recall that in an exponential growth model the relative 
acceleration rate would be constant.)  While this is not proof of super-exponential 
acceleration, it is certainly consistent with it.  
 
These features provide corroborating evidence for social learning, but they certainly do 
not constitute identification.  For example, we cannot rule out the possibility that in the 
mid-1930s there was an exogenous shock (e.g., a price war among seed companies) that 
caused the sudden uptick.
25   Moreover, the sharp rise in acceleration is equally consistent 
with the social influence model.   In this case, however, there is evidence from another 
source – namely Griliches’s study – that social influence was probably not the sole 
explanation. The reason is that, in a social learning model the rate of adoption depends on 
the potential gain from adoption, whereas in a social influence model this is not the case.  
One of Griliches’s main findings was that in the midwestern states generally (including 
                                                 
24 If 
t Δ  is the slope in period t , then 
11 ( )/ / 1
tt t t t ++ Δ− Δ Δ Δ Δ = −  is an estimate of  the relative 
acceleration rate at t . 
25 It is worth noting, however, that Griliches investigated whether price changes in hybrid seed could 
explain the rates of adoption in various parts of the Midwest (including Iowa), and he found no significant 
effect (Griliches, 1957, p.503).    34
Iowa), the rate of adoption in each region was positively correlated with the estimated 
monetary gain from adoption, just as the social learning model predicts. 
 
Interval  i Δ   1 /1 ii + Δ Δ− 
1927-29 1.0  -- 
1930-32 1.4  1.4 
1933-35 5.6  4.0 
1936-38 18.3  3.3 
1928-30 1.4  -- 
1931-33 1.7  1.2 
1934-36 9.5  5.6 
1937-39 18.3  1.9 
1929-31 1.8  -- 
1932-34 3.0  1.7 
1935-37 15.4  5.1 
1938-40 12.2  0.8 
 
Table 1.  Relative acceleration rate measured over three-year intervals.  i Δ  is the average 
annual change (in percent) over the i
th  interval, and relative acceleration is   1 /1 ii + ΔΔ − . 
 
Putting all of this information together, we can say that social learning is consistent with 
the observed pattern of diffusion of hybrid corn, although we cannot say that it was the 
sole explanatory factor.  However, we can also say with some confidence that inertia and 
contagion were probably not the sole explanatory factors (and given Griliches’s findings 
neither was social influence).    
 
While the Ryan and Gross study is quite limited in scope, it highlights some of the issues 
that would need to be addressed in a more complete empirical analysis.  First, one would 
need a curve – or set of curves -- that are measured at frequent time intervals.  The reason 
is that one requires an accurate estimate of the acceleration pattern at precisely the point   35
where acceleration is most rapid, hence frequent observations in this part of the curve are 
crucial for running tests of significance. Second, one needs data that cover the whole 
lifecycle of the adoption process, including the very early phases when adoption is just 
getting started.  Many of the data sets in the literature are quite weak in this respect; the 
reason, of course, is that researchers are not likely to focus their attention on an 
innovation until it is already well underway. 
 
Third, the framework developed here applies to situations where there is informational 
feedback between members of a group who interact more or less at random.  If 
information flows through a fixed network, say between individuals who are near 
neighbors (in a geographical or social sense), then a different analysis will be required.  
(Ryan and Gross did not say whether farmers learned more or less uniformly from others 
in the community, or mainly from their immediate neighbors.)  Fourth, we have restricted 
our attention to social learning models in which people can directly observe outcomes 
generated by other adopters. In the case of hybrid corn this assumption seems reasonable; 
indeed Ryan and Gross specifically say that farmers looked at their neighbors’ fields to 
assess the viability of the new technology (Ryan and Gross, 1943, p.16).  In situations 
where direct observation is not possible, one would need an analog of the theory in which 
inferences are made indirectly.  
 
Finally, the Ryan and Gross study highlights the importance of having supporting data 
about the agents’ sources of information and the reasons they delayed in acting on it.  
These contextual details, combined with an analysis of the shape of the curve, have the 
potential to discriminate between alternative diffusion mechanisms even when detailed 
micro-level data are unavailable.    
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Proof of Proposition 1.  Define the function  () H t = ()/ () ()/ [ () ( 1 () ) ] ht pt pt pt pt = −  ; 
this is well-defined for all  0 t >  because by assumption  (0) 0 p γ = >  , hence  () 0 pt >  
when  0 t >  .  We need to show that  ( ) 0 Ht<  . 
 
For each parameter pair () λ γ ,  let  () ( 1 () ) qt pt λγ λγ ,, = −  denote the proportion of the 
() λ γ , -population  that has not yet adopted by time  t.  The proportion of the total 
population that has not adopted by t is therefore  
 
(A1)                                                       () () qt q td λγ μ , =∫ .                                                  
 
For each () λ γ ,  we have 
 
(A2)                                                () ( () ) () pt p t qt λγ λγ λ γ ,, = +  .                                           
 
Integration with respect to μ  yields  
 




(A4)                           
1 () () () tq tqt d λγ λ λμ
−
, = ∫  and 
1 () () () tq tqt d λγ γ γμ
−
, = ∫ .                  
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Note that  () t λ  and  () t γ  are the expected values of λ  and γ  in the population of non-
adopters at time t.   It follows that 
 
(A5)                                         () ()/ [ () () ] () ()/ () H tp t p t q t t t p t λ γ = =+  .                             
 
Claim:     
(A6)                                        For every  0 t > ,  () () () 0 tpt t λγ + ≤   .                                                               
 
Proof of claim.  For every  0 t >  we have 
 
(A7)                                
2
( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]
()
() [ () ]
qt d qt d qt d
t
qt d qt d
λγ λγ λγ
λγ λγ








 ,                        
and 
(A8)                                
2
() [ () ] [ () ]
()
() [ () ]
qt d qt d qt d
t
qt d qt d
λγ λγ λγ
λγ λγ








 .                         
 
T o  s h o w  t h a t   () () () 0 tpt t λγ +≤   , multiply (A7) by  () pt  and add it to (A8); after 
simplifying we obtain the equivalent condition  
 
(A9)    [ (( ))( )] [ ( )] p tq t dq t d λγ λγ λ γμ μ ,, + ∫∫  [( ( ) ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ] p tq t dq t d λγ λγ λ γμ μ ,, −+ ∫ ∫  0 ≤ .     
 
We need to show that (A9) holds for every  0 t > .   (Notice that t does not vary in this 
expression; t is fixed and integration is taken with respect to λ  and γ .)  We know from 
(A2) that  () ( () ) () qt p t qt λγ λγ λ γ ,, =− +   for every λ γ , , and t.   Substituting this into (A9) 
we obtain  
 
(A10)                  
2 [ (( )) ( )] [ ( )] p tq t d q t d λγ λγ λ γμ μ ,, + ∫∫
2 [( ( ) ) ( ) ] pt q td λγ λ γμ , ≥+ ∫ .            
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Fix  0 t >  and define the random variables  
 
(A11)                                   (( )) ( ) X pt q t λγ λγ , =+  and  () Yq t λγ , = .                               
 
The realizations of  X  and Y  are determined by random draws from μ .   Thus (A10) 
follows directly from Schwarz’s inequality: 
22 2 [] [ ] ( [] ) EX EY EX Y ≥ .  This establishes 
the claim.   
 
We can now apply this result to show that  () H t  is strictly decreasing in t for all  0 t > .  
Differentiating  () H t  we obtain 
 
(A12)                                         
2 () () ()/ () () ()/ () Ht t t pt tpt p t λγ γ =+ −     .                          
 
By the above claim,  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 tpt t λγ + ≤   , so division by  () 0 pt >  yields 
() ()/ () 0 tt p t λγ +≤   .    Thus the sum of the first two terms on the right-hand side of 
(A12) is nonpositive.   But the last term is strictly negative, because  () 0 t γ >  for all  0 t >  
given the initial condition  (0) 0 γ γ => .   Hence  ( ) 0 Ht<   as was to be shown. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.  The equations of motion are   
 
(A13)                                                 () [ ( () ) () ] p tF p t p t λλ λ λ = −  ,                                      
 
where the initial conditions are  (0) 0. pλ =   By assumption  (0) 0 Fλ > , hence  () 0 pt λ >   
for all sufficiently small  0 t >  and 
 
(A14)                                               ( )/ ( ) [ ( ( )) 1] pt pt f p t λλ λ λ = −    .                                    
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By hypothesis the functions  ( ( )) f pt λ  are strictly increasing on some common 
neighborhood of the origin 0( ) p tp << .   It follows that, for every λ  and all t in a 
suitable interval (0, ] T , 
 
(A15)                                             
2 ()/ () ( ()/ () ) 0 pt pt pt pt λλ λλ − >     . 
 
Hence we have 
 
(A16)                                                            () () () p tp t p t λλ λ >    ,                                       
 
(A17)                                                   () () () () pt pt d pt d p t λλ λ νν >= ∫ ∫     .                        
 
By Schwarz’s inequality,  
 
 (A18)                              
1/2 () () ( () () ) () () p t p t pt d pt d pt pt d λλ λ λ ν νν =≥ ∫ ∫∫       .             
 
Combining this with (A17) we conclude that  () () () p tpt pt >    , which implies that 






, that is,  ()/ () pt pt    is strictly increasing on (0, ] T .  This concludes the 
proof of Proposition 2. 
 
 
 
 